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Book Reviews

"HE'LL TAKE HIS STAND"
DRED

SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF
CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL. By Mark A. Graber. 1
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. xiii +
264. $40.00.
Ken I. Kersch 2

I. INTRODUCTION

Mark Graber's Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional
Evil will strike many as one of the more Mephistophelian sallies
of constitutional thought published in quite some time. In its
dense, tightly argued pages, Graber stumps for the infamous majority opinion of Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney in Scott v.
Sanford (1857), and assaults what (these days, at least) is an unwonted bete noire: the constitutional thought of Abraham Lincoln. Although this book is good history, drawing extensively on
primary source research, Graber's interest in Dred Scott is instrumental and theoretical. He uses the case as a vehicle for
questioning the legal academy's conventional wisdom concerning what constitutions are, what they do. how we (and judges)
should interpret them. At the top of Graber's target list are constitutional theorists, be they liberal "perfectionists" or conservative originalists. As Graber sees it. while these two camps disl. Professor. Department of Government & Politics. University of Maryland.
2. Director. Clough Center for the Study of Constitutional Democracy. and Associate Professor of Political Science. History. and Law. Boston College. Thanks to the
members of a panel on Graber's book at the Annual Meeting of the New England Political Science Association (May 2007). Mark Graber. Mark Tushnet. and Beau Breslin. for
a stimulating discussion. as well as to Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn. Ronald Kahn. George
Thomas. and Keith Whittington.
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agree over both method and results, they are united in their
commitment to theorizing the single best way to interpret the
constitutional text, and to fixing the right meaning of particular
constitutional provisions.
Ever the pugalist in fighting form, Graber attacks the perfectionists not at the weakest but at their strongest point. He
alights upon the Dred Scott case, not for its intrinsic interest, but
precisely because the rejection of the "best" possible interpretation of a constitutional provision here has the worst possible
consequences: pure and unadulterated evil. 3 If the "best'' interpretation is off-limits in countering human bondage, he asks implicitly, when would it ever be in limits?
Perfectionist constitutional theorists like James Fleming,
Christopher Eisgruber, and Ronald Dworkin (and, perhaps, constitutional theorists more generally) (p. 18), Graber complains,
engage in "[ o ]bsessive searches for 'correct' answers to past and
present contested questions of constitutional law [that] are politically futile, even when possible jurisprudentially" (p. 3). 4 His
criticism of these theorists is that, mired as they are in philosophical abstractions, they misunderstand fundamentally the
worldly politics of the genesis and nature of constitutional governments.
"Powerful social groups," Graber, the social scientific empiricist, instructs:
are unlikely to accept any constitutional arrangement, clear or
ambiguous, that they believe undermines their vital interests
and fundamental values. Constitutions settle political conflicts
successfully in the short run by providing pre-existing answers
to contested political questions. They successfully settle po-

3. Hence. Graber's ostensible suhject: "the problem of constitutional evil." which
"concerns the practice and theory of sharing civic space with people committed to evil
practices or pledging allegiance to a constitutional text and tradition saturated with concessions to evil" (p. 1 ).
4. Here. Graber insists that the inherently political nature of constitutions may not
be overcome bv even the most dexterous-and intellectually successful-efforts at interpretation. Sub~equently. however. Graber seems to back away from this position. emphasizing instead for issues that count. there are likely to be multiple plausible "correct"
answers ("When political controversies have long excited a constitutional community.
the central legal claims of all prominent participants will be well grounded in institutional. historical. aspirational. or other constitutional logics" (p. 4 ).): See also p. 17:
"Constitutional law is almost always structurally incapable of generating the clear right
answer that might resolve hotly disputed constitutional questions. When a relatively enduring constitutional controversy divides a society. every position that enjoys substantial
political support rests on plausible constitutional foundations."). On this point. m the
end. the book is inconsistent.
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litical conflicts in the long run by creating a constitutional
politics that consistently resolves contested questions of constitutional law in ways that most crucial political actors find
acceptable (p. 3).

Such territory is, thus, by its very nature, inhospitable to perfectionism.
There is much to this critique. But one of the most interesting consequences of taking this emrirical, social scientific critique to its logical conclusion is that (in Graber's hands, at least),
this New York Yankee arrives at the most vigorous defense of
Calhounian and Confederate constitutional thought published in
nearly half a century. As such, a book that started out canvassing
the limitations and blindspots of contemporary constitutional
theory ends up unwittingly shedding considerable light on the
limitations and blindspots of contemporary empirical political
science. Potentially then-and in ways that the author doesn't
always grapple with- this is a very deep book.
II. GRABER AS POLITICAL SCIENTIST
Readers of Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional
Evil should not be fooled by the absence of graphs, charts, and
statistical regressions: Graber may be a law professor and lawyer, but here he preens his bona fides as a card-carrying political
scientist. The presuppositions of the book-and the base from
which Graber sets out to attack the conventional wisdom of the
legal academy, including constitutional theory's various interpretative schools-are in (value free) social science. The argument
Graber advances in Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional
Evil depends upon a resolutely social scientific understanding of
a Constitution as a bargain struck amongst self-seeking groups
and individuals with diverse assumptions, goals, and interests.
Each comes to that bargain, and signs on to it, with the understanding and expectation that over the long term, those goals
and interests will be advanc~d through a life lived within the
framework of that agreement.'
5. In a lengthy discussion towards the book's end. Graber does re-consider these
same issues in a lawyerly way from the perspective of various law of contracts frameworks. including those discussing ··relational contracts."' Of course. the problem of ''evil"'
inherent in this particular agreement also raises issues of contractual provisions against
public policy and unconscionablility. This playful and engaging chapter taking up the
question of the degree to which contractual agreements and constitutional agreements
are analogous seem to have been appended as an afterthought to engage that slice of the
legal academy allergic to the political scientific framework of the rest of the book (pp.
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Such an approach, of course, is not premised on the notion
that people are without values and moral convictions. Rather, in
the distinctively modern spirit that underwrites contemporary
social science, it brackets them. It takes the existence of diverse,
divergent, and often deeply felt convictions about issues that
matter to people a great deal as givens. More than that, it takes
their existence as rendering political society necessitous in the
first place. Only by entering into such an arrangement can such
potentially warring individuals live together in peace. As such, to
the modern sensibility, the bracketing of moral questionsincluding, as here, matters of good and evil-is not shallowness
or evasion: it is the point.
The spirit of two social science moderns, the seminal Thomas Hobbes, and the contemporary Arend Lijphart, loom over
this book, though the first is not mentioned, and the latter only
in passing (pp. 188-91). Hobbes was the first to argue rigorously
and systematically that the primary purpose of founding a
state-the Leviathan-was to exit a state of war and enter a
condition of peace." It is perhaps less appreciated that, in fashioning this argument concerning the origins and purpose of government, Hobbes became the progenitor of modern political science. For ancient political thinkers, like Plato and Aristotle, the
study of politics began with (inherently philosophical) questions
of the nature of justice, virtue, and the good. Hobbes, instead,
was animated by a single empirical, '"value free" question: he
wanted to know, given actual, real-world conditions, what
worked. 7
The contemporary political science comparativist, Arend
Lijphart, is a Hobbesian in the sense that all empirically-oriented
political scientists are Hobbesians: he brackets questions of justice, virtue, and the nature of the good, and asks what works. Lijphart is a student of constitutional arrangements, with a particular interest in what sort of constitutional arrangements "work"
198--218).
6. See THOMAS HOBBES. LEVIATHAN (1651). The social contract theorist who
might have loomed over Graber's argument. but doesn't. is. of course. John Locke.
Given that Locke combines the social contract with a theory of inherent natural rights
whose denial justifies a refusal to enter into civil society-and a right of revolution-a
Locke-haunted discussion of the constitutionalism of Lincoln. Taney. and Dred Scott.
would force the author to contemplate matters from a perspective that transcends the
pure empiricism that he endeavors to stick to here. See JOHN LOCKE. Two TREATISES
OF CiVIL GOVERNMENT (1690).
7. See LEO STRAUSS. NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953). This orientation is
evident in at least one important work of another early modern. NICCOLO
MACHIAVELLI. THE PRINCE (1515).
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successfully in divided or "plural" societies where there is pronounced "segmental" disagreement, whatever its source, be it
divergent pecuniary interests, or deep moral antagonisms. As for
Hobbes, the desideratum for Lijphart is peace: successful constitutional arrangements in plural societies are evident when the
polity remains politically stable, unified, and functional.
Graber's litmus test for the U.S. Constitution is Lijphart's
litmus test for the world's many constitutions. Graber's analysis
is premised on his understanding of antebellum American political society as what Lijphart called a plural society. His understanding of the American Founding conceives of it as what Lijphart called a "consociational" bargain. What many will take as
Graber's provocative sympathy for the constitutional arguments
advanced by Roger Taney, Stephen Douglas, and the Constitutional Union Party's 1860 presidential candidate John Bell, is
premised on Lijphart's contention that plural polities stay together by bracketing deep moral disagreement, and by agreeing
(as the American Founders did) to give significant minority interests the power to veto initiatives that effect their vital interests-all features of consociationalism.
In Graber's hands, then, the story of the Dred Scott case
thus becomes a story about how, as conditions changed-the invention of the cotton gin, the rise of abolitionism, and westward
expansion-majoritarian understandings of the nature of the
original constitutional bargain began to overpower the original
consociational constitutional understandings, and a majoritarian
political order threatened to eclipse a consociational one. In a
consociational constitutional order, when a segmental interest
(like the South) begins to lose-or perceives it is losing-its veto
power over matters trenching upon its vital interests, it is pointless to blame it for either the substance of its interests (inquiries
into that are bracketed: if they consider it important, constitutionally speaking, it is), or for its decision to exit the political order altogether (which, so far as consociationalism is concerned,
is a "right" in the value-free sense that it can be done). The
measure of the success of the consociational order is whether it
fell apart or not. This one did: therefore, what the Union side did
must have violated the (consociational) spirit of the original
Constitution. Lincoln's constitutional understandings took insufficient cognizance of the consociational nature of the original
constitutional bargain, something that Douglas and Bell understood better than Lincoln did. It is this that wins them Graber's

778

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 24:773

high praise, and merits the devaluation of Lincoln as a constitutional thinker.
III. THE CONSOCIATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL VISION
With a few exceptions, scholars of domestic American constitutionalism have not considered our constitutional arrangements from the perspective of comparative political scientists
who study the failures and successes of constitutions around the
world.~ And the possibility that our original constitutional understandings might best be understood as consociational has figured
hardly at all. A brief introduction to consociationalism, by way
of the work of Arendt Lijphart, would thus be apt.
The core issue that the consociational paradigm addresses is
the problem that "it may be difficult, but it is not at all impossible to achieve and maintain stable democratic government in a
plural society." 9 The question is how to succeed in such an endeavor. On the basis of empirical evidence, Lijphart argues, the
road to success is paved with constitutional consociationalism.
Consociational democracy can be defined in terms of four
characteristics. The first and most important element is government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society. This can take several
forms, such as a grand coalition cabinet in a Parliamentary
system, a "grand" council or committee with important advisory functions, or a grand coalition of a president and other
top officeholders in a presidential system. The other three basic elements of consociational democracy are (1) the mutual
veto or "concurrent majority" rule, which serves as an additional protection of vital minority interests, (2) proportionality as the principle standard of political representation, civil
service appointments, and the allocation of public funds, and
(3) a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its
1
own internal affairs. "

"Elite cooperation is the primary distinguishing feature of consociational democracy." 11 Governing takes place through elite
K But see WALTER MURPHY. CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2006); MARK
BRANDON. FREE IN THE WORLD (1998): STEPHEN ELKIN, RECONSTRUCTING THE
COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC (2006).
9. ARENDT LIJPHART. DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 1 (1977) (hereinafter.
LIJPHART. DEMOCRACY).
10. !d. at 25.
11. /d.atl.
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bargaining. It involves not government by majority vote (which
requires losing minorities to lump losing votes, even if they are
on matters which, to them, are matters of deep concern). but instead by government through a grand coalition- which Lijphart
calls "coalescent" or "consensus" government. I'The power of mutual veto is a crucial feature of consociational arrangements:
Decisions have to be made in grand coalitions, and when
these are reached by majority vote. though the minority's
presence in the coalition does give it a chance to present its
case as forcefully as possible to its coalition partners, it may
nevertheless be outvoted by the majority. When such decisions affect the vital interests of a minority segment, such a
defeat will be regarded as unacceptable and will endanger in11
tersegmental elite cooperation.

Coalescent or consensus government thus naturally entails a
considerable degree of segmental autonomy.
Although he underplays the provenance of his conceptual
framework, it is clear throughout this book that Graber is discussing the antebellum constitutional system in the United States
in a thoroughly consociational language. This would make considerable sense to Lijphart himself: after all, he cites the antebellum U.S. as being a classic consociational order. There, a segmental cleavage posed a threat to the stability of the system if its
interests were not accommodated through consociational means.
Even without hewing to explicit Calhounian theory of concurrent majority (which Lijphart cites repeatedly, and favorably, as
one of the most highly developed discussions of a key mechanism of consociational constitutionalism), federalism and a difficult-to-amend written constitution served as important instruments for the minority veto, one of the pillars of
consociationalism. ~
1

12.
13.
14.

!d. at 25.
/d. at 36.

AREND LIJPHART. DEMOCRACIES: PATI"ERNS OF MAJORITARIANISM AND
CONSENSUS GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIES 33 (1999) (hereinafter.
LIJPHART. PATTERNS]. For allusions to Calhoun's concurrent majority in Lijphart's
work. see LIJPHART. DEMOCRACY. supra note 9. at 30: AREND LIJPHART. THE POLITICS
OF ACCOMMODATION: PLURALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NETHERLANDS 125
(1968): LIJPHART. DEMOCRACY. supra note 9. at 37. 125. 149. See JOHN C. CALHOUN.
DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT ( 1849).
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IV. REHABILITATING DRED SCOTT
The vehicle Graber uses for driving home these conceptual
points about the consociational origins of American constitutionalism is Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857). In Dred Scott, the
Court declared as a matter of law, first, that blacks are not citizens, and, second, that, because slaves were the property of their
owners under the protection of the Fifth Amendment's due
process clause, Congress has no power to ban slavery in the territories.15
Graber complains that most contemporary assessments of
the Dred Scott decision are undertaken with contemporary legal
agendas in mind that warp our understandings of constitutional
history. These assessments, propagated by contemporary perfectionists and originalists alike, assume that: 1) the Founders were
"wise and virtuous," 2) slavery is evil; and, therefore, 3) Taney's
opinion in Dred Scott sustaining it on originalist grounds must
have been a fundamental misreading of the Founders' Constitution. Such assessments, in Graber's view, "[minimize] the extent
to which the original Constitution accommodated that peculiar
institution" (p. 22).
This is something that Chief Justice Taney understood.
Graber endeavors to prove that "Taney's constitutional claims in
Dred Scott were well within the mainstream of antebellum constitutional thought" (p. 28). He does so through extensive historical research into the nature and content of those understandings. Citing a cascade of antebellum state court opinions, for
instance, Graber concludes that "The judicial denial of black
citizenship reflected beliefs held by the overwhelming majority
of antebellum jurists in both the North and the South. Virtually
every state court that ruled on black citizenship before 1857 concluded that free persons of color were neither state nor American citizens" (pp. 28-29).
Taney's views on slavery and citizenship, moreover, were in
the mainstream of Jacksonian and Democratic Party thought.
And they were anticipated in formal opinions issued by the U.S.
Attorney General (p. 30). Moreover, these understandings were
not held by Democrats alone. Graber marshals a raft of contemporaneous declarations from northern officials, Republican and
Whigs, expressly agreeing with Taney's view in Dred Scott that
blacks could not be citizens. He notes that Lincoln himself, in his
15.

Scott v. Sandford. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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debates with Stephen Douglas, refuses to criticize this aspect of
Taney's opinion (p. 32). Even the harshest critics of Taney's
opinion, like Susan B. Anthony, acknowledged that it reflected
the widely held understandings of the time (p. 33). Graber contends that Taney's much mocked argument that the fact that
blacks had voted in the Founding era (cited by the vehement dissents of Justices Curtis and McLean) did not, ipso facto, entail
black citizenship was, historically, dead-on: non-citizen suffrage
was common at the time, and politicians from across the political
spectrum agreed that suffrage did not entail citizenship (p. 49).
The story is similar when it comes to the power of Congress
to ban slavery in the territories. Here, there was disagreement
over the scope of Congress's powers from the outset. Graber observes that "Thirty years after ratification, all living Southern
Framers maintained that they had not intended to vest Congress
with the power to ban slavery in the territories, while the surviving Northern framers uniformly maintained they had intended to
vest Congress with that power." Both, Graber argues, were plausible interpretations of the 1787 Constitution (p. 66). Contemporary efforts defending Congress's power to accomplish this on
the basis of McCulloch v. Maryland's broad reading of the necessary and proper clause, Graber claims, are anachronistic, reading that decision more in light of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal
than of Andrew Jackson's America (pp. 71-72). In reality, the
scope of Congress's powers in this area is a matter to which the
Framers either gave, or expressed, little thought (p. 73). Taney's
arguments on these matters may not have been right. But there
is little doubt they were familiar, common to their time, and
plausible.
However plausible these arguments may have been, given
the depth of the conflict, was the (unelected) Court the right institution to resolve these questions? Many antebellum political
actors certainly thought so, Graber explains: they repeatedly insisted that the question was one that would be best resolved by
the judiciary (pp. 33-35). 16 And many saw the Taney Court in
particular as especially well-suited to resolving it. They looked at
that Court-which was dominated by Southern unionists and
conservative northerners-not as a tool of the slave power (as
many today talk about it), but rather as a "remarkably centris[ t
institution, and the most likely venue for resolving contentious

r

16. See also Mark A. Graber. The Non-Majoritiarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary. 7 Snm. AM. POL. DEV. 35. 46--50 ( 1993 ).
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sectional questions in a moderate. workable way (pp. 36-37).
How centrist was the Court? Graber suggests that we decide by
comparing its political temper. not to our own. but to that of
other contemporaneous national institutions. He adduces a fair
amount of evidence, for instance, that it was more centrist than
the Congress of the same era.
The implications of this research are potentially quite significant. For. if Taney's opinions on these legal issues were well
within the mainstream of their time then, even if we concede
that Taney's reading of the Constitution was flat-out wrong (as
Graber does not), we are led ineluctably to conclude that his
Dred Scott opinion was neither arrogant nor activist-that it
manifestly did not involve a judge willfully reading his own idiosyncratic political views into law. In the context of the evidence
adduced by Graber. Dred Scott becomes (to borrow Jeffrey
Rosen's terms-though not his judgment about the Dred Scott
17
case itself) a classicly "multilateralist" decision.
But can we at least concede the Dred Scott was activist and
infamous in its effects? Did Dred Scott create a political firestorm that hastened the disintegration of the Union? Graber insists that that question must be answered by looking to the reactions not of committed secessionists, but to those of peaceful
unionists. Drawing on the previous work of historians, he finds
no evidence that the decision led to any more votes for Republicans which, in spiral of action and reactions, hastened the dissolution of the Union. In this regard, he fingers the Lecompton
constitution, not Dred Scott, as the real culprit (pp. 40-41 ).
17. That is (to borrow Jeffrey Rosen's nomenclature). the Dred Scott decision was a
case of the Court acting ·'multilaterally." on the basis of considerable support in the polity for its constitutional understandings. JEFFREY ROSEN. THE MOST DEMOCRATIC
BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006). As I noted in a brief review of
Rosen's book-and as Graber's book makes evident as a case in point-even when the
Court seems to be acting most preemptively (and. hence. in an "activist'" way), rather
than simply inventing its arguments out of whole cloth. it is usually relying on some widespread understandings held somewhere in the polity. This makes Rosen's model considerably less useful than he supposes. The trick (and the trick Rosen adopts in his book) is
to look hard for that support in areas that he likes, and to do a cursory search that fails to
discover it in areas that he doesn't. See Ken I. Kersch. Review of Jeffrey Rosen, The
Most Democratic Branch: How the Courts Serve America. 112 COMMENTARY 70-72 (Oct.
2006). This point may be deepened. as Graber, drawing on the work of Rogers Smith,
deepens it, by emphasizing the "multiple traditions" of liberalism. republicanism, and
ascriptive Americanism simultaneously threading through American political thought
throughout the country's history. All are available as anchors for political argument at
most points in American history. Rogers M. Smith. Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and
Hartz: The Multiple Traditions in America. 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549-66 (1993). Rosen
himself uses Dred Scott (and Roe v. Wade) as examples of classically "unilateralist" decisions.
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None of this, as noted above, means that Dred Scott was not
"wrong" in a normative or moral sense, or (relatedly) as a matter
of interpretive method: on an issue of such deep moral import,
shouldn't the Court's justices (as today's aspirationalist theorists
might suggest) have followed their hearts and not their heads,
and- in this case at least, involving fundamental issues of bondage and freedom-recurred to their own sense of morality and
justice in interpreting the broad provisions and spirit of the Constitution? Here, once again, Graber spies an anachronism, one
which unmasks the wonted solipsism of contemporary constitutional theorists. All the evidence suggests that had the justices
hearing the Dred Scott case been committed to aspirationalism,
Chief Justice Taney's majority in Dred Scott would actually have
swelled even larger. The historical record is clear, Graber instructs his contemporaries, that even Justice Curtis of Massachusetts, who wrote one of the case's famed dissents, was a committed racist, and evinced considerable sympathy for slavery. In
other words, white supremacy was the aspirational position for
these judges. "The aspirational critique of Dred Scott,'' Graber
writes, "is at bottom based on the silly proposition that Southerners fought to the death to preserve what they know in their
hearts was a necessary evil. Slavery was embedded in the way of
life that most Southerners and some Northerners thought intrinsically valuable and expressive of the highest constitutional aspirations" (p. 83). Put otherwise, slavery's proponents and defenders in antebellum America were aspirationalists: they had racist,
and white supremacist aspirations. 1x
Graber uses these facts as an opportunity to criticize virtually any sort of constitutional method as a hedge against badeven evil- political results. He explains:
all forms of constitutional logic are capable of yielding evil results. Institutional arguments yield evil results whenever
elected officials and popular majorities support evil laws. Historical arguments yield evil results whenever constitutional
framers and ratifiers constitutionalize evil practices. Aspirational arguments yield evil results whenever constitutional
framers have evil constitutional values (p. 83).

Thus, approaching Dred Scott through the prism of contemporary academic debates about the best way to interpret the
constitutional text is folly. Graber argues that we would gain a
richer, and more accurate understanding of the case, and the
18.

See Smith. supra note 17.
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constitutional questions it raised, if we look at it through the
prism of the framework of government that was set up by the
original constitution, and then consider how well these institutions functioned in resolving disputes in a changing polity developing, over time, economically, geographically, socially, and politically. The real problem-for which the Dred Scott case
became a flashpoint-was not one of erroneous interpretations
but rather one of "flawed constitutional institutions" (p. 91).
Of course, this does not free Graber from the burden of interpretation. It requires that he advance his own interpretation
of the purposes that the institutions created at the founding were
designed to achieve. "The Constitution of 1787," he writes,
"sought to secure a balance of sectional power by establishing
institutions thought to give both the free and slave states a practical veto on national policy .... The framers understood that
slavery might be restrained or even abolished under the constitutional arrangements agreed upon in 1787, but they believed that
would happen only when many Southerners thought such policies desirable" (p. 92).
The core principle of the original Constitution, for Graber,
the social scientist. was bisectionalism. The constitutional founders "were more concerned with devising institutions that would
facilitate bisectional agreements on slavery policy than with determining the substance of those agreements in advance. The
more perfect union crafted in Philadelphia primarily relied on a
constitutional politics constructed to yield policies that moderates in both the North and the South would support" (p. 96). As
such, they created not- as the constitutional theorists insistconstitutional law, but rather the framework for a constitutional
politics. "[T]he framers bequeathed to their descendents a set of
constitutional institutions they hoped would facilitate future
bargaining over the constitutional status of slavery. Constitutional exegesis was supposed to resemble renegotiation as much
as interpretation'' (p. 171 ).
In agreeing to the 1787 Constitution, "Northerners were assuaged by the paucity of explicit textual protections for slavery,
Southerners by their expected control of the national government" (p. 109). "Poor communication between different regions
prevented most participants in state ratification conventions
from fully realizing the different interpretations of the constitutional compromises over slavery being advanced during the ratification process in noncontiguous states" (p. 110). "The Constitution drafted in Philadelphia was interpreted as sufficiently
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proslavery to be ratified in the South and sufficiently antislavery
to be ratified in the North" (p. 12).
The test of the wisdom of these constitutional arrangements
was in the living. The constitutional order framed at Philadelphia
initially functioned fairly well. "National parties [whose rise was
neither predicted nor desired by the Founders] became the primary vehicle for preserving the original constitutional commitment to bisectionalism." Underlying the original constitutional
bargain, Graber contends, was an understanding that "crucial ...
political elites in both the free and slave states had to approve all
constitutional settlements on slavery issues" (pp. 3, 92, 115, 14044).
Southerners indeed were dominant in national politics, initially, and, when they were dominant, they favored the expan19
sion national power (pp. 116-17). As the Louisiana Purchase
manifests, they were also initially quite supportive of westward
expansion (pp. 118-20). Things changed, however. Over time,
settlers unexpectedly flocked to the Northwest rather than the
Southwest (p. 92). "[E]very decade between 1820 and 1860 witnessed an increase in the relative population and political power
of the North" (p. 126) And in what Graber calls "the new constitutional politics of slavery," it became increasingly clear to all
that the region that controlled the west would control the national government (p. 136). That region, it also became increasingly clear, relatively early on, would be the North.
Nevertheless, between 1820 and 1850, under what Graber
calls the "modified constitution," the slaveholding republic was
maintained by the "combination of representatives with Southern sensitivities, presidents with bisectional coalitions, and proslavery majorities on the federal bench" (p. 149). "The Jacksonian Party system and the Jacksonian Democratic Party were the
primary means by which mid-nineteenth century Americans preserved their original commitment to bisectionalism," he writes.
The national party system "fostered cooperation between freeand slave-state politicians'' (p. 144). "Public policy under the
Jacksonian regime was both republican and proslavery because
politicians in the free states gained necessary Southern support

19. The degree to which southerners actually favored national power at this time is
perhaps overstated by Graber here. though his drawing attention to the significant instances in which they did is a helpful corrective to the conventional wisdom that they
were unalloyed states-righters from the beginning.
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for their nonslavery interests only by providing certain protections for slaveholders" (p. 145).
As time went on, free sailers and abolitionists came to see,
understand. and execrate this modus vivendi (pp. 149-50). Soon,
there developed a "real debate ... over whether the original
constitutional commitment to bisectionalism should be modified
or abandoned" (p. 13) The Wilmot Proviso, and the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo were arrows aimed at the heart of the order's bisectional assumptions. But they fell without making a direct hit on their target. Nevertheless, "balance rule" powersharing arrangements continued to unravel as demographic
trends led to persisting free state control over the House of Representatives and, in time, the Presidency, and as slaveholders divided amongst themselves by "party, ideology, and region" (pp.
5, 143-44). In an ominous sign, sectional parties developed.
By the time of Dred Scott, the stresses on the old order were
intense. The origins of the Dred Scott case were in efforts by
party leaders to preserve the bisectional status quo constitutional
order-and not in the inclination of the Court to resolve the
question by fiat. "The national party leaders who foisted responsibility for slavery on the federal judiciary," Graber explains,
"attempted to maintain bisectionalism by vesting veto power
over slavery policies in the only remaining national institution
with a Southern majority" -the Supreme Court (p. 13).
What else were they to do? The original design of the Constitution practically foreordained that it would be left to the
Court, rather than other institutions, to seek to resolve this incendiary matter. Over time, Article II shunted the moderates on
the question out of contention for the Presidency. For instance,
Graber observes that Millard Fillmore, a committed New York
constitutionalist who might have been the Whig candidate for
President in 1852, and won with the sort of bisectional support
that would have promoted sectional compromise, was done in by
Article II. Graber notes that Fillmore had a lot of support in
many states, but majority support only in one, which earned him
3 percent of the electoral college vote, while he had the support
of 22 percent of the voters. Those candidates who could have
appealed to the more compromising median voter-which they
hadn't the incentive to do under the prevailing rules of our constitutional system-were similarly frustrated (pp. 154-55).
Stephen Douglas and John Bell were presidential candidates
who appealed to the median voter, but who lost out given these
rules (p. 166). Under these arrangements, come the 1850s, the
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Taney Court was arguably the national government's most representative institution.
Graber contends that the candidate for president in 1860
who remained truest to the spirit of Constitution's original spirit
was not Lincoln-who insisted, wrongly, that the framers intended to place slavery "in the course of ultimate extinction"
and, accordingly, ''promised to accommodate no more evil than
constitutionally necessary"- but rather John Bell, "who promised bisectional solutions to contested constitutional questions,"
with the aim of "preserve[ing] the conditions under which slavery might have been abandoned peacefully" (p. 5).~ As such,
Graber concludes, "The Constitution caused the Civil War by
failing to establish institutions that would facilitate the constitutional politics necessary for the national government to make
policies acceptable to crucial elites in both sections of the country" (p. 167).
For Graber, it is precisely what many people praise about
Abraham Lincoln that he finds most damning: the fact that Lincoln repeatedly declared slavery a moral and constitutional evil.
This status as evil, Lincoln believed, "obligated slave-state citizens to acquiesce whenever Republican constitutional majorities
interpreted ... constitutional ambiguities as sanctioning antislavery policies" (p. 173). This, however, was a fundamental misreading of the nature of the Constitution, whose nature was consociational, and. whose abiding founding commitment was to
bisectionalism.
0

V. THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC
CONSTITUTIONALISM
Strangely enough for a scholar whose other recent writings
tout a "regime politics" approach to U.S. constitutional development, Graber's analysis of the nature of America's constitutional regime stops dead in its tracks with the election of 1860: in
this book, Graber says practically nothing about what came after. For a work of history, which would be limited in temporal
scope, this ordinarily would not be a problem. For a work of
constitutional theory, however, it is. Without any consideration
of the new constitutional nation that arose in the Civil War's aftermath-the new constitutional regime-it is difficult to make
20.

Quoting Abraham Lincoln, 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM

LINCOLN 18 (Roy P. Basler, ed .. 1953).
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any useful assessment of the virtues of Abraham Lincoln's constitutionalism. This is because, to be counted a successful constitutional thinker, Lincoln's reputation must rest in considerable
part not only on how, looking backwards, he described the constitutional republic, but in how the nation realized his understandings after the war. Lincoln's most enduring success, after
all, was to forge a constitutional vision that purported not only to
comprehend the past, but to make the future.
There may be lots of talk about development in this bookeconomic, political, geographical. But, in Graber's hands, all that
development plays out against the backdrop of a constitutionalism that is determinatively-perhaps definitionally-static. It is
true that Graber provides for the possibility that an originally
consociational constitution might develop into something differ21
ent. But he insists that, if it does so, it must be through-and
only through- the means set out by a rigidly adhered to consociationalist theory- that is, by bisectional methods. 22 In this.
Graber is, in his own way, as rigid as the starchiest of conservative originalists.
Put otherwise. Graber makes this a book about fidelity
rather than (as we might expect from a scholar committed to a
regimes perspective) about transitions. Douglas and Bell were,
similarly, preoccupied with fidelity-which is why Graber is so
fond of them. Lincoln is a much more complicated case-which
is why pretty much everyone else is so fond of him. Clearly, Lincoln is setting out new constitutional understandings (while, at
the same time, drawing deeply upon the Constitution and
thought of the American past). And the war came.
Even if we once had a consociational constitution, or a constitution that a key group of southern segmental elites understood as having been consociational, the Union victory in the
Civil War brought the consociational period of American consti21. Lijphart provided for the possibility that consociationalism. in some cases. could
be a developmental concept: it could succeed. and render itself superfluous. LIJPHART.
DEMOCRACY. supra note 9. at 2.
22. As such. the rules of consociationalism are to Graber's Constitution what the
Article V amendment process are to today's originalists. Regarding the means to change.
Graber argues-briefly. and in passing-that Lincoln was too precipitous. If he had understood and acknowledged the bisectional foundations of U.S. Constitutional arrangements. as did Stephen Douglas and John Bell, the sectional disagreements over slavery in
the territories might have been worked out over time. gradually. and peacefully (this
throw-awav counterfactual is asserted. not argued). Instead. Lincoln took the more radical (and. u'!timatelv. disastrous) course of insisting on altogether new constitutional understandings-of i~sisting on the amendment of the Constitution by means outside of its
(implicitly) stipulated procedures.
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tutionalism to a close. Or put, otherwise (to transpose what
seems novel in this book into the eminently familiar). the Civil
War essentially brought the Webster-Hayne debate to a close:
23
the Whigs (and the Republicans) won. This being the case, and
given that Graber's stance is rather statically originalist, one is
lead to the conclusion that, so far as the United States is concerned, the consociational starting point he adopts here for
thinking about constitutions amounts to little more than an interesting foray into antiquarianism. To be sure, there are other
countries around the world that, today, might be best described
as sectional and plural. But, the U.S. after 1865-after Lincolnshould not properly be counted amongst them.
For a book that aims to speak to contemporary (American)
constitutional theorists, this is no small matter. Given where the
book ends, Graber doesn't effectively address the question of
whether or not, even if we accept his controversial characterization of the American constitutional founding as consociational,
the constitutional order we live in today is consociational. If it
isn't, and if the consociational Constitution Graber describes
died in the Civil War, Graber's rejoinder to perfectionist (and
other) constitutional theorists is seriously undercut. For presumably these theorists are offering their views on the best way
to interpret our Constitution today-and not the best method for
interpreting the Constitution in 1857. At the end of this book,
Graber asks that we approach our own present day constitutional
disputes as if we were voting for John Bell over Abraham Lincoln, because John Bell properly understood the antebellum
constitution consociationally. But, at bottom-and remarkablywhat he is asking us to do is interpret the Constitution today as if
the Civil War had never taken place. Graber has made no argument, and adduced no evidence whatsoever, for the proposition
that this is a sensible way to think about our own present day
constitutional disputes. Surely it is no accident that we today are
more appreciative of Lincoln's constitutionalism than John
Bell's. 24
23. See ROGAN KERSH. DREAMS OF A MORE PERFECT UNION (2001): see also
Graber (p. 60).
24. Lijphart characterizes the U.S. svstem as an ··intermediate form" between the
majoritarian "Westminster Model" and th~ consociational "consensus model." He argues
that "majoritarian democracy is especially appropriate for. and works best in. homogeneous societies. whereas consensus democracy is more suitable for pluralist societies ...
He notes that "[I]n a political system with clearly separate and potentially hostile popula·
twn segments. virtually all decisions are perceived as entailing high stakes. and strict majority rule places a strain on the unity and peace of the system ... Majoritarian systems are
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Well, some people are more appreciative of Lincoln. Drawing upon the very best understandings of contemporary social
science, we can, today, appreciate the folly of Abraham Lincoln.
Like Graber, Lijphart, the consociational empiricist, is full of
warnings about the path that Lincoln actually took:
Although the replacement of segmental loyalties by a common national allegiance appears to be a logical answer to the
problems posed by a plural society, it is extremely dangerous
to attempt it. Because of the tenacity of primordial loyalties,
any effort to eradicate them not only is quite unlikely to succeed. especially in the short run, but may well be counterproductive and may stimulate segmental cohesion and intersegmental violence rather than national cohesion. The
consociational alternative avoids this danger and offers a
mor~ promising method f<;>~ achie~in&, both democracy and a
considerable degree of political umty.-

Graber's argument leads ineluctably to the conclusion that,
were he advised by card-carrying members of the American Political Science Association stocked to the brim with empirical
studies of the conditions for the maintenance of consociational
constitutional systems in plural societies, Lincoln would have
been told in no uncertain terms not to do what he did. Similarly,
extensively cited APSA comparativists, Graber instructs us,
could have told the intransigent foes of the expansion of slavery
westward (not to mention those committed to abolishing it
where it actually existed) that they were on a dangerous mission.
What they were engaged in was likely to lead to calamity. Since
we can predict the likely outcome, given the prevailing conditions (social science) and since peace is the paramount value
(Hobbes), ergo, Taney and Douglas and Bell were right, and
Lincoln was wrong.
Was the original U.S. Constitutional order consociational or
majoritarian? This depends on whether or not American society

able to transcend division-though perhaps not the deepest-through the mechanisms of
cross·cutting cleavages. and through the assumption that power will alternate between
segments over time. When a single issue-like slavery-grows in significance to the point
where the segmenting grows close to becoming uni-dimensional. and where members of
the minority segment lose faith in the possibilities for the alteration of power over time.
the constitutional svstem begins to break down. LIJPHART. PATTERNS. supra note 14. at
3: LIJPHART. DEMOCRACY. supra note 9. at 28-29. This simply pushes the question back
a step. and asks whether the U.S. is (or was) best understood as a homogenous or a pluralist society. Graber insists that. prior to the Civil War. it was essentially-or. at least.
potentially-plural. Lincoln insisted it was essentially homogenous.
25. LIJPHART. DEMOCRACY. supra note 9. at 24.
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as it is, and as it was, is better described as ''homogenous" or
"plural.'' Which is it? Was the fact that we had a Civil War evidence of a constitutional failure? Or was the real failure in
rooted either in the institution of slavery itself, or (as the old "irrepressible conflict" school of Civil War studies-whose arguments Graber echoes repeatedly here) in irreconcilable sectional
differences that no initial agreement could have navigated effectively?c" In the face of profound evil, is the fact that a nation resorts the war a sign of failure or of virtue? Is war ever justified?
Graber the constitutionalist makes a valiant-if not necessarily noble-effort to move beyond these inherently normative
judgments through recourse to modern, empirical social science.
While the fruits of his effort were instructive, however, it was ultimately a lost cause.

26. This outlook was succinctly summarized by the historian F.W. Owsley in his
contribution to the important statement of the Nashville agrarians. /'1/ Take My Stand.
published in 1930: "This agrarian society had its own interests. which in almost all respects diverged from the interests of the industrial system of the North. The two sections.
North and South. had entered the revolution against the mother country with the full
knowledge of the opposing interests of their societies .... [T]hey had joined together under the Constitution fully conscious that there were ... united two divergent economic
and social systems. two civilizations. in fact. The two sections were evenly balanced in
population and in the number of states. so that at the time there was no danger of either
section's encroaching upon the interests of the other. This balance was clearly understood. Without it a union would not have been possible. Even with the understanding
that the two sections would continue to hold this even balance. the sections were very
careful to define and limit the powers of the federal government lest one section with its
peculiar interests should get control of the national government and use the powers of
that government to exploit the other section .... But the equilibrium was impossible under expansion and growth. One section with its peculiar system of society would at one
time or another become dominant and control the national government and either exploit the other section or else fail to exercise the functions of government for its positive
benefit. Herein lies the irrepressible conflict. the eternal struggle between the agrarian
South and the commercial and industrial North to control the government either in its
own interest or. negatively. to prevent the other section from controlling it in its interests.
Lincoln and Seward and the radical Republicans clothed the conflict later in robes of morality by making it appear that the "house divided against itself" and the irrepressible
conflict which resulted from this division marked a division between slavery and freedom. Slavery ... was part of the agrarian system. but only one element and noi the essential one. To say that the irrepressible conflict was between slavery and freedom is either
to fail to grasp the nature and magnitude of the conflict. or else to make use of deliberate
deception by employing a shibboleth to win the uninformed and unthinking to the support of a sinister undertaking." F. W. Owsley. The Irrespressible Conflict. in TwELVE
SOUTHERNERS. I'LL TAKE MY STAND: THE SOUTH AND THE AGRARIAN TRADITION
24-25 (Louisiana State University Press. 1977 (1930]). In DRED SCOTT AND THE
PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL. Graber tracks this argument in most of its essentials-though. unlike the adherents to the Irrepressible Conflict thesis-he does place
slavery at the heart of the Southern system.

